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The Measure of Injury  is an intellectual tour de force of gender- and1
race-based jurisprudence applied to critical issues in the law of torts.
Destined to become a landmark in legal scholarship, this book deserves to
be widely read, discussed, and debated. In their compact, but rich and
provocative volume, the authors—Martha Chamallas of Ohio State
University and Jennifer B. Wriggins of the University of Maine—shed light
on numerous issues related to the law governing accidents and intentional
injuries.
The text engages the reader both directly and indirectly. Not only do
the authors raise numerous important issues, but the spirit of the book soon
causes the reader to formulate other questions about how the tort system
works and what it achieves. Although The Measure of Injury is focused
more on “deconstruction” than “reconstruction,” and furnishes only limited
specific proposals for reform,  the book offers insights into the American2
tort system and the challenges it faces. Even readers who differ with the
authors’ analysis are likely admit that Chamallas and Wriggins are asking
important questions that too often are not raised.
I. A Radical Challenge to Existing Tort Law
Persons perusing The Measure of Injury should not necessarily expect
an “easy read.” The volume is highly intellectual, and generally assumes
familiarity with not only the main features of American tort law, but with
numerous key points on which scholarly and professional opinions differ
regarding what the law should be. The authors’ arguments are carefully
reasoned, lucidly explained, and abundantly supported by citations to
theoretical literature and primary sources.
Law professors are undoubtedly one target audience. It is easy to
picture The Measure of Injury as the focus of law school seminars.
Practicing lawyers, sitting judges, and other readers more immediately
interested in what courts and legislatures do today, than in what scholars
say or what legal history teaches, might not persevere until they reach the
heart of the argument. This is because the early sections of the book offer
a detailed, but inevitably dense, discussion which locates the authors’ thesis
 MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:1
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) (hereinafter “THE MEASURE OF INJURY”).
 See id. at 6 (describing the authors’ advice on reforming tort law as “limited2
and highly contextual”).
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within a broader theoretical context. However, the initial daunting
geography of schools of legal theory soon gives way to a fascinating
landscape where the discussions center on many of the most important torts
topics of the twenty-first century and earlier eras. 
A. Identity-Based Scholarship
The authors explain that they draw upon feminist theory (including
liberal, cultural, radical, and intersectional feminism),  critical race theory3 4
(including the practices of “asking the ‘race subordination question,’”5
appreciating the “racial implications of neutrally phrased doctrines,”  and6
requiring justification of “disparate impact”  ), and general critical theory7 8
(including postmodernism ). Chamallas and Wriggins reject the adequacy9
of the “law and economics” and “corrective justice” paradigms,  and take10
“for granted”  much of the Legal Realist legacy. As the authors explain,11
“this book ... falls under the genre of identity-based scholarship.”12
One of the things that makes the book so energetic is that the authors
occasionally volley between being seemingly mainstream and
revolutionarily challenging. For example, in one paragraph they say that
they “start from an assumption that tort rules ought to be evaluated by
their ‘real world’ success, ... rather than by some measure of internal logic
or consistency.”  This statement is unlikely to alarm many old-style13
“Restatement-type”  scholars (i.e., “the torts establishment” ) who believe14 15
that the “function of tort law is [to] compensate and deter.”  Yet in the next16
two paragraphs, the authors assert that they are “highly critical of the
Restatement approach and the implicit tort theory that underlies it,”  and17
that their goal is to effect a “change in the ‘deep structures’ of tort law ...
 See id. at 25.3
 See id. at 13, 26-28.4
 Id. at 27.5
 Id.6
 Id. at 24.7
 See id. at 13-14.8
 See id. at 16.9
 See id. at 15-16.10
 Id. at 20.11
 Id. at 8.12
 Id. at 20.13
 Id. at 17.14
 Id. at 16.15
 Id. at 17.16
 Id. at 20.17
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that reflect and reinforce the social subordination of women and racial
minorities.”18
B. Prioritizing Emotional Harm and Relationships
The authors make clear early in the book that their quest is “radical,”
in the sense of going to the root. They challenge “the dual premises that
accidental injury lies at the core of tort law and that physical injury, rather
than emotional harm or injuries to relationships, is of paramount
concern.”  Thus, they contest what they insist  are the well-entrenched19 20
(and misguided) suppositions that the law of negligence (rather than
intentional torts) is the primary focal point in American tort law,  and that21
 Id.18
 Id. at 2.19
 At various junctures, the authors argue that the subject of intentional tort20
liability is largely ignored by modern legal education—to the detriment of women
and minorities who will ultimately be served by law school graduates. See THE
MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 64, 70. Whether this is true is open to
question. Admittedly, the law of negligence is complex, and it takes a great deal of
time to cover all of the basic rules (relating, for example, to the reasonably prudent
person standard and relevance of customary practices) and the special cases (such
as the complex rules governing negligence liability for failure to act and premises-
related injuries). However, most casebooks give substantial attention to both the
simple intentional torts (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and
chattels, and conversion) and complex torts (such as misrepresentation, nuisance,
defamation, and invasion of privacy) for which intentionally tortious conduct is
either required or a common path to liability. Many of these intentional torts are
tested on the widely used Multistate Bar Examination, which makes it somewhat
probable that these subjects are not ignored in law school classes. Moreover, it
seems likely that discussion of intentional tort liability plays a prominent role in
classroom coverage of many doctrines not specifically focused on intentional tort
causes of action, such as punitive damages, spoliation of evidence, concerted action
liability, respondeat superior, joint and several liability, contribution, indemnity,
statutes of limitations, and immunities. Some torts theorists may have largely
excluded intentional torts from their research focus, but it seems doubtful that the
many hundreds of professors who teach tort law in American Bar Association-
approved law schools have done so. Today’s graduates may be better acquainted
with the contours of intentional tort liability than the authors expect. This would
seem to be particularly true of students who take Advanced Torts courses at the
scores of law schools where such courses are taught, since with respect to those
types of subjects (such as fraud, libel, slander, appropriation of name or likeness,
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, tortious
interference with contract or prospective advantage, trade libel, and slander of
title), intentional tort liability looms far larger than does negligence-based liability. 
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 20.21
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tort law is mainly about liability for physical harm to persons and property
damage.
II. Centrality of Race and Gender
One of the main objectives of the authors is to “connect the current
emphasis on negligence, physical harms, and economic damages to gender
and race bias, broadly conceived.”  In part, the book argues that the gender22
and racial aspects of torts cases should be made more visible.  However,23
the authors go much further. They attach “fundamental” importance to
gender in analyzing tort doctrines and evaluating potential reforms.  The24
authors assume as a given that tort law reflects “a basic pattern of male
dominance,”  and that “whiteness has long served as an unstated default25
in tort law.”  However, the authors say that gender and race equity should26
not be “the only goal ... or even the most important goal of tort law in every
context.”  Rather, the authors align themselves “with the ‘pluralist’27
scholars who regard the quest for a unified theory of torts as futile and
undesirable.”28
A. Refining the Argument
At various junctures, the authors strive to refine their arguments
relating to tort law and race. For example, after explaining for several
pages that consciousness of race should infuse tort law, Chamallas and
Wriggins opine that “overemphasis [can be] placed on race in calculating an
accident victim’s prospects for future income.”  In the final chapter of the29
book, they point out (to the likely surprise and dismay of many readers)
that race-based life-expectancy tables are still being used by experts who
play important roles in the resolution of tort cases involving calculations of
lost earnings.  The authors argue, quite appropriately, that “[w]hen courts30
rely on gender- and race-based earnings tables, it means that historical
patterns of wage discrimination in the labor market are replicated in tort
awards, even though the labor-force participation of social groups may be
changing rapidly.”31
 Id. at 3.22
 See id. at 7.23
 Id. at 21.24
 Id. at 18.25
 Id. at 28.26
 Id. at 33.27
 Id.28
 Id. at 18.29
 Id. at 158-70.30
 Id. at 159.31
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The authors also discuss tort liability related to children mixed up at
birth and given to the wrong parents. They explain that sometimes the
cases involve “reactions to race, when, for example, a child from an
unintended [sperm] donor turns out to be of a different race than the
mother or siblings.” The authors argue that “[t]o award a couple damages
for emotional distress in such a case might well reinforce racial prejudice
or racial antipathy and might be understood as making a statement that it
is reasonable for a person to reject a child for the sole reason that his skin
color or physical attributes are different from the plaintiffs’.”  The authors32
opine that in such cases it is justifiable for a court to use the doctrine of
proximate causation to cut off liability to avoid undermining “important
public policies, such as promoting racial equality or furthering the best
interests of the child.”33
B. Selective Perception and Related Risks
Viewed in all of its complexity, the authors’ argument seems to be that
matters of race should be taken into account by tort law when cognizance
will benefit persons who are members of classes that have historically
suffered from discrimination, but not otherwise. Nevertheless, the risk of
“selective perception,”  which the authors note, is a reason why it is34
dangerous to focus on race at all, particularly in a society where the
demographics of “majority” and “minority” are shifting. It is easy to strike
the wrong balance with regard to identity-related matters, such as race and
gender, about which many persons feel deeply. Some readers will protest
that it is better to leave an express consideration of race out of tort law
altogether. The argument would likely be that less damage is done by
treating persons simply as persons, not as African-Americans, Whites,
Hispanics, Mixed-Race individuals, and so on.
The authors correctly note that “because the tort system is committed
to individualized determinations—with few checks for systemic
bias—devaluation [of persons and their injuries based on race] ... is largely
invisible and unaddressed in contemporary law.”  This is troubling35
particularly because lay juries often play a critical role in tort litigation
decision making processes. The authors explore in detail how racial
perceptions can distort even seemly neutral inquiries, such as those related
 Id. at 112.32
 Id. at 112.33
 Id. at 2934
 Id. at 28.35
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to factual causation.  However, they do not explain how the risks of harm36
resulting from racial bias and prejudice of jurors can be eliminated from the
tort system. 
A juror’s cameo appearance in tort litigation offers virtually no
opportunity for affected litigants to scrutinize, or ever know, whether the
resolution of their case was infected by impermissible bias or prejudice
based on race, gender, or other grounds. At least with respect to judges,
there is an opportunity to evaluate their conduct over a period of years.
Moreover, American judges are subject to professional discipline for
discriminatory conduct involving race or gender.  Perhaps ad hoc lay juries37
should be replaced by “professional jurors” of the kind recommended by
some commentators  or by judges sitting as fact finders.  “England and38 39
most countries depend exclusively on judges for the resolution of disputes,
completely abandoning the jury system.”  Moreover, if racial bias and40
prejudice are an invisible, pervasive, and ungovernable risk in lay jury fact
finding, perhaps the use of lay juries does not make sense in multi-cultural
societies. Maybe individualized awards of damages should be replaced by
some standardized mode of compensation more akin to worker’s
compensation than to the current tort system. Alternatively, perhaps lay
participants in the judicial resolution of disputes should act only in
conjunction with professional jurists, as is true in certain Civil Law
 Id. at 126 (discussing distortion resulting from stereotyping). See generally36
id. at 119-53.
 See Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.3(B) (2010) (providing that “[a] judge shall37
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or
prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation...”).
 See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury38
Room: an Unnecessary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865, 881 (1996)
(noting that “[s]ome commentators even suggest discarding the jury system entirely
and, instead, conducting trials before professional jurors or judges alone to improve
the system’s accountability”).
 But see Chief Justice Phil Hardberger, Juries Under Siege, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J.39
1, 12 (1998) (arguing that, in Texas ,the powers of juries have already been
excessively limited).
 Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling40
for Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 1, 2 (1998). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, & COLIN B.
PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN
LAW 532 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that “[t]he jury died in England in most civil cases
for a variety of reasons”).
8 ON RACE, GENDER, AND RADICAL TORT REFORM
countries where lay and professional judges serve as members of a joint
decision making panel.41
C. The Difficulties of Historical Analysis
It may be impossible to analyze the history of American tort law fairly
and accurately from a racial perspective. This is true because, as the
authors candidly acknowledge, reported cases—especially recent
decisions—rarely mention the racial identities of the parties.  Even older42
judicial opinions seldom commented on such matters. Focusing too heavily
on dated tort precedents which referred to the race of the parties carries
with it obvious risks. Placing analytical weight on such anomalies may
distort both the explanation of legal history and recommendations bearing
on current practices.
In their review of tort precedent related to race and gender, the
authors explore a number of important historical topics: the doctrine of
coverture, which merged a woman’s legal rights with those of her
husband ; the “nervous-shock” cases, that often denied recovery for certain43
types of emotion-related harm, such as miscarriages ; wrongful-death44
cases, where damages were devalued because of the plaintiff’s race;  and45
wrongful-birth cases, where resistance to compensation for interference
with the constitutional right to an abortion emerged “in a highly gendered
setting,” and courts, at least initially, tended to fix responsibility for losses
relating to birth defects solely on pregnant women.  These discussions are46
always interesting and vividly illustrated. However, readers who live in a
world of instant news, and who may be reluctant to urge a court to rely on
even a thirty-year-old case, may have difficulty seeing the relevance of
topics related to cases decided long ago, often before Eisenhower, Coolidge,
or even McKinley was President. The world has changed. It is interesting
to know how courts decided torts cases prior to Brown v. Board of
 See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental41
Alternative Fill the American Need, ABA FOUND. RESEARCH J. 195, 195-96 (1981)
(discussing the German version of the “mixed court” of lay and professional judges).
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 28.42
 See id. at 35-36.43
 See id. at 36-47.44
 See id. at 37, 48-62.45
 Id. at 137; see generally id. at 128-38.46
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Education  or the Civil Rights Act of 1964,  but there is a valid question47 48
about what this says about courts today.
Of course, the authors’ goals in offering these “historical frames”  are49
large. The authors intend to illustrate that issues related to race and
gender have always been a problem, and that there are a multitude of ways
in which considerations related to race or gender can infect the tort system.
This is an important and astute observation. However, even if this
viewpoint is accepted as given, there is the question of how to approach the
problem. Presumably, there are at least three alternatives. One option is to
place a heavy emphasis on race and gender issues. This is what Chamallas
and Wriggins do with fervor, energy, and great skill in their book. Another
option is to ignore these issues as far as possible in search of race-blind and
gender-blind justice. The authors would argue that this is impossible
because the “underlying continuity of gender and racial hierarchy ...
reproduces the same—yet different—tort law.”  The third option is to50
address issues of race and gender selectively on the assumption that a
lighter touch will raise consciousness without alienating those who must
embrace the reforms that in many respects are needed. However,
Chamallas and Wriggins are fearless advocates. They are not concerned
about alienating potential supporters of reform by over-stressing race- and
gender-based issues. The authors are interested in radical change, not
ameliorative half-steps. 
III. The Victim’s Perspective
Chamallas and Wriggins distinguish their approach to tort law from
other perspectives, such as law-and-economics scholarship, which view tort
issues from the position of the decision-maker, that is, the legislator or the
judge.  In contrast, the authors focus on the “victim’s perspective,” and the51
“position of the governed.”  There is nothing wrong with this. Genuine52
concern for a victim’s plight is dictated not only by good tort theory, but by
basic principles of humanity and common decency. Of course, the interests
of defendants must also be considered. Justice cannot be achieved by
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Teaching47
Transformative Jurisprudence,41 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 533, 536 (1991)
(suggesting that Brown was “the most important pronouncement ever made by a
United States court”).
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw 2010).48
 This is the title of Chapter 2 of THE MEASURE OF INJURY.49
 THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 62.50
 See id. at 20.51
 Id.52
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focusing only on those who have been wrongly harmed, but neglecting the
interests of those wrongly accused of causing harm. 
It is essential to remember that women and minorities are not only
victims of tortious conduct, but also alleged perpetrators of torts. They not
only sue when their privacy is invaded,  but are sued for invading the53
privacy of others.  Pregnant women not only suffer emotional distress54
when their unborn children are harmed,  but they cause emotional distress55
to fathers by negligently harming their unborn children.  Women and56
minorities drive cars, operate small businesses, represent clients, and heal
patients. When their activities produce losses, female and minority actors
are sued and called upon to defend their conduct. They have rights when
they are defendants, just as they have rights when they are plaintiffs. It
cannot be assumed that women or minorities are only victims, or that
solicitude for those groups necessitates a pro-plaintiff bias.
IV. Appealing Arguments and Interesting Questions
The authors raise many questions and observations that are
intellectually interesting and professionally challenging. For example, they
query whether “certain types of injuries (e.g., emotional harm) or certain
types of damages (e.g., noneconomic damages) have been devalued in part
 See, e.g., Pendleton v. Fassett, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78322 (W.D. Ky.)53
(allowing an invasion of privacy claim based on intrusion to go to trial because
there was evidence that a student was made to bare her breasts during a search for
drugs); Alderson v. Bonner, 132 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Idaho App. 2006) (permitting
recovery for intrusion upon seclusion because, even though “standing on another’s
front porch and looking through a window in the door is not normally offensive,” an
uninvited man’s “peering in the window at a young female, with video camera in
hand and without announcing his presence, ... is objectionable”).
 See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354-55 (N.C. App. 1996) (holding that54
a privacy claim was stated against a wife who hired private investigators to install
a hidden camera in the bedroom of her estranged husband’s separate residence). Cf.
Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 154-56 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that there
were issues of fact as to whether a wife, who hired a private investigator to install
a hidden video camera in the bedroom she shared with her husband, invaded her
husband’s privacy, and whether the investigator was liable for knowingly assisting
the wife in the commission of tortious acts).
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 102-12 (discussing reproductive55
harm).
 Cf. Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 362 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that56
public policy did not preclude liability in a wrongful death action brought by a
father to recover against the mother's automobile insurer when their unborn child
was stillborn as a result of the mother's negligent driving).
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because of their cognitive association with women.”  Similarly, the authors57
observe that lead paint litigation—which has generally been unsuccessful
in providing remedies to injured persons —“most often arises in low-58
income, predominantly minority communities, where there is a large stock
of deteriorating older buildings that pose a lead paint hazard, especially to
children.”  Likewise, Chamallas and Wriggins note that while most states59
hold that “bystander” claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress
should be limited to close family members, typically related by blood,
marriage, or adoption, “this exclusion of nontraditional families can have
a negative impact on minority families, which often do not mirror the white
middle-class ideal.”  60
Some readers will doubt the accuracy or usefulness of the authors’
assertion that tort law “reflects a masculinist viewpoint that ... seems
oblivious or indifferent to the ... suffering many women experience,”  or61
that sexual abuse has been perpetuated “by male focused standards of
consent.”  The authors contend that intentional tort law and the negligence62
doctrine have failed to make “protection of sexual autonomy and integrity
a high priority.”  However, the numerous cases holding that (male)63
defendants are subject to liability for transmitting sexually-related
diseases,  for spying on naked women,  and for various forms of clergy64 65
 THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 24.57
 See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008) (holding58
that a State action related to lead paint hazards failed because there was no
infringement of a “public right” sufficient to support a cause of action for public
nuisance and because the State did not allege that the defendant manufacturers
were in control of the lead pigment at the time it caused harm to children).
 THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 138-53.59
 Id. at 115.60
 Id. at 26.61
 Id.62
 Id.63
 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990) (imposing liability for64
negligent transmission of herpes simplex II). See also John B. v. Superior Court,
137 P.3d 153, 161 (Cal. 2006) (holding that liability for the tort of negligent
transmission of HIV does not depend solely on actual knowledge of infection and
includes situations where the actor has reason to know of the infection).
 See, e.g., Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding65
that the installation of hidden viewing devices constituted an invasion of the
privacy of women using a roller rink restroom, and that whether the defendant
actually used the devices to observe the women was relevant only to the issue of
damages).
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sexual abuse  would seem to prove otherwise, at least in recent decades,66
but also in some earlier cases.  67
Chamallas and Wriggins raise many issues which have natural appeal
to anyone who believes that there is a moral imperative to strive to make
the world a better place. Two of those issues relate to tort liability for
domestic violence and reproductive injuries.
A. Domestic Violence
The authors argue that victims of domestic violence are routinely
deprived of recourse under tort law by short statutes of limitations,
technical procedural rules, and a related system of insurance that denies
coverage for claims by women abused at home.  Moreover, they argue that68
“violence against women in the home ... should be treated as seriously in
the law as stranger violence.”  Issues of this sort are important and69
certainly merit open-minded consideration.
 See, e.g., Moses v. Episcopal Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Col. 1993)66
(finding, in an action by a parishioner who entered into a sexual relationship with
an associate priest during a counseling relationship, that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendants, an Episcopal bishop and the
diocese, owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and that they violated that duty by
not providing the parish with personnel files indicating that the priest had
psychological problems); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (recognizing
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress
arising from a clergyman’s sexual relationship with a parishioner). See also Doe v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 2008) (holding that a two-year
statute of limitations applicable to a clergy sexual abuse claim begins to run only
when the victim reaches the age of majority, but finding that the claim was barred
because more time had passed); Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that a church was not entitled to
summary judgment on a claim for reckless infliction of emotional distress arising
from a former priest’s alleged molestation of children); John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese
of Milwaukee, 734 N.W.2d 827 (Wis. 2007) (holding that a fraud claim related to
clergy sexual misconduct was not barred by the statute of limitations). See generally
TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE (2008).
 A famous early example of judicial recognition of personal autonomy and67
integrity in sex-related matters is De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). De
May held that a doctor could be liable for failing to disclose that the young man he
brought with him to provide assistance, while a woman gave birth to a child, lacked
medical qualifications.
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 3.68
 Id. at 25.69
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The authors accurately note that “the most formidable barrier to tort
recovery for domestic violence victims lies ... in the law’s failure to require
or encourage insurers to provide adequate protection for victims of
intentional harms.”  However, despite discussing the “moral hazard”70 71
issue and calling for “serious debate,”  the authors do not offer a plan for72
remedying this deficiency.  The political and social obstacles to bringing73
domestic violence effectively within the scope of standard insurance
coverage are substantial. The solution to the lack-of-insurance problem is
not obvious.
B. Reproductive Injuries
Chamallas and Wriggins devote great attention to torts involving
sexual relations and what might be called “reproductive injuries”—harm
involving sterilization, conception, pregnancy, and birth. With vivid
illustrations drawn from actual disputes, and detailed consideration of
cases that were badly decided, they probe issues related to compensation for
emotional distress and relational injuries, as well as ancillary issues, such
as consent. At some junctures the discussion is breathtaking, as where the
authors explain that a federal court in Maryland held that forced
sterilization was not actionable as battery “because it did not cause any
additional physical pain, injury or illness other than that occasioned by the
C-Section procedure,”  during which the plaintiff was unconsensually74
subjected to bilateral tubal ligation.
V. Breaking Down Doctrinal Boundaries
Chamallas and Wriggins argue that it is necessary to rethink the
boundaries between torts and domestic relations law and between torts and
civil rights statutes.  They contend that this must be done in order for tort75
law to capture and compensate the recurrent injuries experienced
disproportionately by marginalized groups as a result of family violence,
workplace harassment, and sex-related injuries.  Thus, the authors76
 See id. at 73.70
 See id. at 72.71
 See id.72
 Wriggins has explored that subject on other occasions. See Jennifer Wriggins,73
Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 121, 122–23 (2001).
 Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493 (D. Md. 2001).74
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 20.75
 See id. at 20, 76-86.76
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“criticize efforts to enforce strict separation between torts and other
domains of law.”77
A. Cross-Boundary Tradition and Precedent
In many respects, the authors’ argument on this point is well-rooted
in American legal precedent and practice. It has long been regarded as
appropriate for tort law to take cognizance of non-tort legislative
enactments in deciding which grievances to remedy. The most obvious
example is liability imposed under a negligence per se theory based on
legislation which neither expressly nor implicitly creates a civil cause of
action.  It is also clear that, in many instances, a plaintiff may pursue tort-78
style remedies under different legal theories for harm resulting from the
same course of action. For example, the fact that a victim of a deliberate
falsehood might (or might not) be able to sue a defendant for violating the
state’s deceptive trade practices act, normally does not foreclose a claim
based on common law fraud principles.  79
Recognizing that provisions found in civil rights or family law statutes
are important expressions of public policy that are relevant to the
development of tort law is hardly a shocking idea. In Feltmeier v.
Feltmeier,  the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that its recognition that80
domestic violence could give rise to an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was consistent with, and complementary to, criminal
laws against domestic violence. Likewise, in Sorichetti v. City of New York,81
the New York Court of Appeals found that the issuance of a statutorily
authorized domestic violence protective order was an important factor
 Id. at 34.77
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM § 1478
(2010) (discussing statutory violations as negligence per se). See generally Vincent
R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C.
L. REV. 255, 264-72 (2005) (discussing negligence per se principles in the context of
statutory obligations to protect data). But see Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble with
Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221, 285-86 (2009) (opining that “[i]t is high time
for courts of last resort to move away from the problematic intent-based approach
of the negligence per se doctrine and to an astute judicial policy analysis approach
for harmonizing nonprescriptive legislative and administrative standards with the
common law negligence standard”).
 See, e.g., VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 166-79
208 (2011) (discussing actions against lawyers by clients and nonclients).
 798 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2003).80
 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that presentation to a police officer of a81
protective order issued under the Family Court Act “obligates the officer to
investigate and take appropriate action”).
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supporting its decision to impose tort liability based on failure to provide
police protection to a child. Nevertheless, it is useful to remember that good
arguments can be made against breaking down the boundaries between
fields of law. Three such arguments, pertinent to the authors’ thesis, relate
to legislative resolution of divisive issues, protection of the integrity of legal
principles, and inefficiency resulting from remedial duplication.
B. Arguments for Separating Areas of Law
1. Deference to the Legislature
First, judicial recognition of a new tort remedy can undercut the
balance struck by legislation addressing a difficult social issue. This would
seem to be particularly true with regard to statutes dealing with race and
gender. In these situations, creation of a new remedy by the judiciary may
displace the bargain struck by the more democratically responsible
branches of government,  the legislature and the executive. In the history82
of Anglo-American law, there has been a tradition—often honored,
sometimes ignored—of leaving the resolution of wrenching questions to
legislators, rather than to judges.  Absent legislative infringement of83
constitutional rights, judicial deference to the legislature may be warranted
by principles calling for respect of the actions of co-equal branches of
government.84
 Of course, this argument is weakest if judges are elected, rather than82
appointed. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling that
judges and judicial candidates may announce their views on controversial issues.
See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-80 (2002) (holding
that rules of judicial ethics which bar judges and judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues violate the First
Amendment).
 See Percy H. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV.83
1, 4–5 (1927) (stating that, traditionally, “[i]f the judges thought that a new remedy
was necessary, they invented it, unless the invention of it would have shocked
public opinion, in which event they left . . . [the task] to Parliament. . .”).
 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 984
(4th ed. 2009), stating that:
It is often urged that certain questions are best left to the legislature
because of its ability to gather facts through the legislative hearing process, to
craft comprehensive solutions to broad-ranging questions, or to represent the
will of the public on highly controversial issues. Presumably, the policy
favoring deference to co-equal branches of government has less force where
legislative or executive action is likely to be distorted by the lobbying of special
interest groups, the under-representation of victims in the decision-making
process, or lack of adequate funding.
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Of course, this argument generally has force only if the legislature
intended to strike an exclusive bargain. Anticipating this point, the authors
focus on the question of relevant civil rights legislation includes language
expressly preempting, or not preempting, common law remedies.  If a law85
provides that common law remedies are not affected by the passage of a
statute, there is little reason for courts to defer to the legislature. However,
the authors point out that even courts faced with statutes containing non-
preemption language have resisted recognition of tort remedies for race-
and gender-related discrimination.86
2. Doctrinal Integrity
Second, there are some boundaries between fields of law which are
important to recognize because they protect the integrity of legal principles.
A useful example can be drawn from the context of defective product-
related tort claims. Suppose that a product purchased by the plaintiff turns
out to be ineffective or does not work at all, but causes neither personal
injury nor damage to other property. It is widely agreed that the plaintiff’s
only recourse is under contract law, and that the terms of the parties’
bargain cannot be circumvented by suing under tort principles.  Otherwise,87
contract law would “drown in a sea of tort.”  A tort remedy is denied to the88
plaintiff in order to ensure that contract principles have meaning. Purely
economic product-related losses fall on the contract side of the boundary
line which sometimes runs between torts and contracts. This arrangement
works because the Uniform Commercial Code has been ubiquitously
adopted.  Even if the parties have not bargained about the allocation of89
purely economic losses, the UCC supplies default principles to resolve
disputes about who should pay.
Conceptually, it is possible that expanding the reach of tort liability to
encompass certain forms of impermissible discrimination could “drown”
some civil rights statutes in a “sea of tort” by providing more generous
terms of recovery. This would be a significant risk in cases where a tort
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 80-81.85
 See id. at 80.86
 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss87
Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 549-52 (2009) (collecting authorities).
 See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,88
866 (1986).
 Cf. Grams v. Milk Products, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171-72 (Wis. 2005)89
(holding that the economic loss rule did not bar tort remedies related to injuries
arising under a service contract because no body of law similar to the UCC applies
to service contracts).
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cause of action (such as intentional infliction of emotional distress) is
interpreted to cover the same basic type of conduct for which a statute has
already defined the conditions and terms of legal remedies. Interestingly,
in this type of situation, supplanting statutory civil rights or domestic
relations legislation with common law principles would reverse the normal
trend of legal development. The tendency in American law has been to
replace rag-tag common law decisions addressing important social issues
in a piecemeal fashion with comprehensive statutory solutions —not vice90
versa.
Still, it is hard not to sympathize with the idea that tort law should be
expanded to provide remedies for types of race- and gender-related
discrimination for which there is, in many cases, no statutory avenue for
redress. This might include. for example, discrimination against persons
based on how they perform their identity (e.g., by resisting stereotypes (as
in the case of effeminate men) or resisting assimilation (e.g., by adopting
“ethnic” hairstyles)).  If a plaintiff can prove to a jury that such91
discrimination amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct deliberately
calculated by the defendant to victimize the plaintiff, recovery for
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, under well-established
tort principles,  should not be barred simply because no statute has created92
a parallel remedy.
However, the authors argue that tort law should do much more than
take a “gap filler”  approach to workplace harassment. They argue in favor93
of pervasive remedies under tort law which reflect the public policies found
in anti-discrimination statutes. More specifically, they urge that tort law
can borrow from Title VII to give meaning to the outrageous conduct
requirement in tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress.94
The authors opine that, at present, intricate tort doctrines send a clear
message that tort law offers little in the way of redress for domestic
violence and workplace harassment.95
 Cf. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 84, at 94 (stating that the “Fair Debt90
Collection Practices Act is a good example of the law’s tendency to replace
common-law developments with statutory ‘solutions’”).
 See id.91
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 45 (Tent. Draft.92
No. 7 2007) (defining the requirements of an action for intentional or reckless
infliction of emotional disturbance).
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 78.93
 See id. at 85.94
 See id. at 86-87.95
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3. Duplication and Inefficiency
Third, any expansion of common law remedies into the provinces now
occupied by civil rights law and domestic relations statutes would pose a
risk of remedial duplication and inefficiency. These types of costs are
sometimes significant because there are limited judicial resources available
for the resolution of disputes.  In other contexts, certain types of claims96
have sometimes been rejected on the ground that they are duplicative. For
example, in the legal malpractice field, a judge may dismiss a breach of
contract claim in a suit that also alleges negligence, if the breach of contract
claim amounts to nothing more than an argument that the representation
was incompetent and negligent.  “False light” invasion of privacy is97
sometimes not recognized as a tort because it overlaps too much with well-
established principles of defamation law.  An action for injurious falsehood98
may fail because the plaintiff could sue for tortious interference with
prospective advantage.   And, touching someone in a sexual manner has99
been deemed not to constitute an actionable invasion of privacy because
offensive touching is actionable as battery and “the tort of invasion of
privacy was not intended to be duplicative of some other tort.”  In100
determining whether tort law should routinely provide remedies for forms
of discrimination already addressed by state and federal legislation, some
account must be taken of the costs of systemic inefficiency resulting from
remedial duplication. In The Measure of Injury, the authors do not address
this issue, focusing instead on the importance of providing better civil
remedies for workplace discrimination and domestic violence.
 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 84, at 9 (discussing the importance of96
administrative convenience and efficiency in the formulation of tort law).
 See Oberg v. Burke, 2007 WL 1418546, *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.). See also Sitar97
v. Sitar, 50 A.D.3d 667, 854 N.Y.S.2d 536 (2008) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation because they arose from the same facts
as the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim and the plaintiff did not allege distinct
damages).
 See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577. 579-80 (Tex. 1994) (refusing to98
recognize false light because defamation encompasses most false light claims and
false light “lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for
defamation, thus unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists between
free speech constitutional guarantees and tort law”).
 See Kenney v. Hanger Prosthetics & Orthodontics, Inc.,269 S.W.3d 866, 87399
(Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So.2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003).100
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VI. Compensating Emotional Distress
A large part of Chamallas and Wriggins’s argument is aimed at
expanding the reach of the two independent torts actions offering
compensation for purely emotional suffering: intentional infliction of
emotional distress,  sometimes called the tort of outrage,  and negligent101 102
infliction of emotional distress.  The authors’ contention is that these103
causes of action have the potential to redress a wide range of losses that are
particularly significant to women and racial minorities.
Despite the fact that the authors compellingly state their case, their
quest faces great obstacles. With respect to actions for intentional infliction
of emotional harm, many states, as the authors acknowledge,  articulate104
the requirements for recovery in exceptionally demanding terms. It will be
difficult or impossible to reverse this course of development because the tort
of outrage has been much litigated and the accretion of unfriendly
precedent is substantial. Moreover, insofar as negligent infliction is
concerned, the law (viewed nationally) is so muddled  that it is hard to105
imagine that this tort will someday offer a reliable path to recovery for
seriously injured plaintiffs in cases not involving observation of the
tortiously caused death or serious injury of a family member. However, the
authors can take comfort from the fact that the Supreme Court of
Tennessee recently opined that “the development of the law in the United
States relating to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims has been
to enlarge rather than to restrict the circumstances amenable to the filing
of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.”106
If there is one obstacle the authors underestimate, it is the difficulty
of quantifying emotional distress damages. Rather, the authors argue that
judicial reluctance to provide compensation for emotional distress “cannot
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 66-87.101
 See, e.g., Klinger v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2010 WL 4237849, *6 (W.D.102
Wash. 2010).
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 89-117.103
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that “[s]ome states104
set the bar of proof of ‘outrageousness’ so high that they allow recovery only in
extremely aggravated” cases).
 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 84, at 569 (stating that “[n]o area of tort105
law is more unsettled than compensation for negligent infliction of emotional
distress” and that “decisions continually restate the criteria for recovery, and there
are often substantial differences in the requirements, or their interpretation, from
one jurisdiction to the next, and within any one jurisdiction at different times”).
 Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that family106
members stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress even though
they did not see the event which injured a child).
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be explained or justified solely by the difficulty of measuring intangible
injuries or finding a logical stopping point for liability.”107
Many types of tort damages, such as lost wages, medical expenses, and
the costs of repairing or replacing property, can be ascertained with
reasonable certainty.  The bills, receipts, and written cost estimates may108
be gathered, and the total added up. Defense counsel may dispute the
reasonableness of such expenditures or the accuracy of the numbers, but
the jury nevertheless has access to concrete evidence to guide its
assessment of how much damage was caused by the defendant’s tortious
conduct. This is even true with respect to out-of-pocket costs related to
emotional distress, such as amounts spent on counseling and prescriptions.
Indeed, even with regard to “parasitic damages” for pain and suffering
incidental to a physical injury,  a jury can make some comparison to out-109
of-pocket losses in determining how much to award for intangible suffering.
It is not uncommon for lawyers negotiating the settlement of cases to talk
about general damages for emotional distress being calculated as a certain
multiple of special out-of-pocket damages.
In contrast, there is little to guide a jury’s assessment of the proper
amount of compensation for purely emotional suffering.  An award can110
have more to do with the eloquence or effectiveness of counsel, the identity
of the plaintiff,  or the efforts of “tort reformers” decrying lawsuit111
“abuse,”  than with the amount of harm actually caused by the defendant.112
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 21.107
 Note, however, that the authors argue many types of economic damages,108
such as future medical expenses and loss of future earning capacity, are
“notoriously hard to measure.” THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 179.
 See generally Kennedy v. Carriage Cemetery Services, Inc., 2010 WL 2926083109
(D. Nev. 2010) (distinguishing “parasitic damages” for emotional harm from
damages that are recoverable in actions for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
 Cf. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (2000) (stating that awards for110
emotional and physical pain are “not easy to evaluate because there is no objective
criterion for judgment”).
 See id. at 1051 (opining that a “claim of “emotional or physical” pain is ... a111
serious threat to the defendant since, lacking any objective components, it permits
juries to roam through their biases in setting an award”).
 In Texas, tort reform battles are sometimes waged on busy highways.112
Roughly a decade ago, a group called Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse erected
billboards saying “Lawsuit Abuse. We All Pay. We All Lose.” It was virtually
impossible to reach the courthouse without seeing one of these signs. I served on
a panel of prospective jurors in a medical malpractice case. During voir dire, the
plaintiff’s attorney asked whether any of the potential jurors had seen the
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These realities create a serious risk that similarly affected plaintiffs may
be treated very differently, and that emotional distress awards may vary
radically from one case to the next. Presumably, to address these concerns
as well as the prospect of “runaway verdicts,” many states, in certain types
of cases, have capped awards for noneconomic losses,  or denied recovery113
for emotional distress not resulting in out-of-pocket expenditures.114
Moreover, scholars argue that awards for psychic suffering are inherently
suspect because emotional distress is simply not monetizable.115
Not surprisingly, Chamallas and Wriggins address these points.  They
argue that caps on noneconomic damages, while neutral on their face,116
have a disparate and devastating impact on women and minorities because
it is harder for such plaintiffs to prove economic losses, and therefore
recovery of noneconomic losses is more important.  They further contend117
that the argument that money damages cannot repair intangible harms is
flawed, because that is also true of certain types of economic losses, for
which recovery of damages is ordinarily not capped.  Some readers will118
find the authors’ arguments on these points persuasive.
VII. Other Important Questions
As Chamallas and Wriggins explain, their book is focused on race and
gender, and they have not “wrestled with other important dimensions of
personal identity, such as sexual orientation, disability, and social class.”119
billboards decrying “lawsuit abuse.” Forty-nine of the 50 potential jurors raised
their hands. The case settled before a jury was empaneled. 
 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Westlaw 2010) (providing that in an action113
against a health care provider based on professional negligence, a plaintiff may not
recover more than $250,000 in noneconomic damages as compensation for pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, or other
nonpecuniary damage). See also DOBBS, supra note 110, at 1071-73 (discussing
capping statutes).
 See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341, 350 (N.H. 1986)114
(allowing recovery for emotional distress damages in a wrongful birth cause of
action only to the extent that they result in “tangible pecuniary losses,” such as
medical expenses or counseling fees).
 Cf. Joseph H. King, Jr, Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem115
Arguments for Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1, 11
(2003) (offering examples of per diem arguments and opposing their use because
they “exploit the suggestible nature” of jurors and “compound the illogic of
attempting to monetize pain and suffering into a damages remedy”).
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 178.116
 See generally id. at 170-82.117
 See id. at 180.118
 See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 23.119
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It would be interesting to know what they think about those issues, and
about whether focusing on those matters would cause the authors to refine
or modify their gender- and race-based critique of tort law. Moreover, it is
intriguing to consider how the authors would address other important
contemporary issues, such those arising in the legal malpractice context. At
many junctures, the authors explore the conduct and responsibility of
medical professionals. Presumably, similar questions could be raised about
the conduct of lawyers.
VIII. Conclusion
Judged by any fair standard The Measure of Injury is an important
book. Even those who disagree with the authors’ sustained emphasis on
race and gender must acknowledge that this volume addresses important
questions about the American tort system in a thoughtful and intellectually
rigorous fashion.
The Measure of Injury presents a coherent vision for radically
reshaping tort law. To the extent that the authors’ arguments are
persuasive, The Measure of Injury may play a key role in revolutionizing
the compensation of intentional injuries and accidents.
